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FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
United States Constitution Amendment I.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof....
New York Constitution Article I, Section 3:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed in this state to all mankind ....
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
Bowden v. Iona Grammar School'
(decided June 11, 2001)
Plaintiffs, Derrick Bowden and others, sued defendants,
Iona Grammar School and John D. Dugan (collectively, "the
school,") seeking a preliminary injunction to enjoin the school
from refusing to allow the infant plaintiffs to attend classes
because they had not received the immunizations required by
New York Public Health Law § 2164.2 It was Bowden's
contention that he should be permitted to attend classes without
receiving immunizations pursuant to the religious exemption of
284 A.D.2d 357, 726 N.Y.S.2d 685 (2d Dep't 2001).
2 Id. at 358, 726 N.Y.S.2d at 686. N.Y. PUB HEALTH LAW § 2164 (7)(a)
(McKinney 2001) states in pertinent part: "No principal, teacher, owner or
person in charge of a school shall permit any child to be admitted to such
school, or to attend such school... without . . . acceptable evidence of
child's immunization ....
1
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Public Health Law § 2164 (9),3 and therefore the government's
conduct violated the Free Exercise Clause of the Federal4 and
New York State5 Constitutions. The Supreme Court of
Westchester County granted the plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction.6 On the school's appeal, the Appellate
Division, Second Department, affirmed the district court's grant
of a preliminary injunction based on the fact that the plaintiffs had
established a likelihood of success on the merits and the
possibility of irreparable harm through the loss of First
Amendment freedoms. 7 The court held that "[iln denying the
plaintiffs a religious exemption on the ground that they were not
members of a recognized religious organization, the appellants
disregarded the statutory requirement of genuine and sincere
religious beliefs." 
8
Bowden began kindergarten at the school when classes
started on September 13, 1999. 9 However, beginning September
21, 1999, the school would not allow him to continue to attend
classes because he had not received the immunizations required
by Public Health Law § 2164.10 Plaintiffs claimed a religious
exemption from the immunization requirements by submitting a
sworn statement along with a letter from their pastor indicating
they were members of the Temple of the Healing Spirit, which is
3 N.Y. PUB HEALTH LAW § 2164 (9) (McKinney 2001), states in pertinent
part: "This section shall not apply to children whose parent, parents, or
guardian hold genuine and sincere religious beliefs which are contrary to the
practices herein required ..... .
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...." (emphasis added).
5 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3. The New York Constitution provides in pertinent
part: "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this state to
all mankind .... "
6 Bowden, 284 A.D.2d at 358, 726 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
7 Id. at 358-59, 726 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
s Id. at 359, 726 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
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a religion opposed to immunizations.11 The school rejected the
demand for a religious exemption because the plaintiffs were not
members of "a bona fide recognized religious organization." 
12
The New York Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs showed
a likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of
irreparable harm.' 3 The Bowden court found that the school had
disregarded the statutory criteria and applied the former standard,
which had previously been held unconstitutional, in denying the
plaintiffs a religious exemption because they were not members
of a religious organization.14 The appellate division agreed with
the lower court's findings, reasoning that when the proper
standard was applied, the plaintiffs' opposition to immunization
seemed to arise from genuinely held religious beliefs.15 Based on
this, the court held that a preliminary injunction was necessary to
prevent an impairment of plaintiffs' First Amendment freedoms.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which
provides that Congress cannot make a law that hinders the free
exercise of religion, has been made applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment.' 6  "The free exercise of
religion means . . . the right to believe and profess whatever
religious doctrine one desires." 17 Thus, the First Amendment
clearly excludes all regulation by government of such religious
beliefs. ' 8 The exercise of religion often involves the performance
or abstention from certain physical acts.19 Therefore, a state
would be prohibiting the free exercise of religion if it sought to
1 Bowden, 284 A.D.2d at 358, 726 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 358-59, 726 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
14 Id. at 359, 726 N.Y.S.2d at 687; see Matter of Sherr v. Northport-East
Northport Union Free Sch. Dist. 672 F. Supp. 81 (1987).
15 id.
16 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77 (1990).
17 Id. at 877.




Janofsky: Free Exercise of Religion
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2002
TOURO LAW REVIEW
ban such abstentions only because they were being engaged in for
religious reasons.
In Employment Division v. Smith,21 respondents were fired
from their jobs with a private drug rehabilitation organization
because they ingested, for sacramental purposes, a drug whose
consumption was illegal under Oregon Law. 22  When the
respondents applied for unemployment compensation, they were
deemed ineligible because they had been discharged for work-
related misconduct.23  The United States Supreme Court
considered whether this prohibition was permissible under the
Free Exercise Clause. Respondents argued that their claim for a
religious exemption must be evaluated under the Sherbert v.
Verne? 4 balancing test.2 5 The Court held that this balancing test
was inapplicable to free exercise challenges of criminal
prohibitions.26 The Court reasoned that "the right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply
with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes conduct that his religion
prescribes.' "27
In determining whether a person should be exempt from
public health law statutory requirements that impact upon the
Free Exercise Clause, the federal courts have applied a two-part
test. First, the court must determine whether the plaintiff's
purported beliefs are religious. 8 If plaintiffs beliefs are deemed
20 Id.
21 494 U.S. at 872.
22 Id. at 874-75.
23 Id.
24 374 U.S. at 402-03.
25 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882-83. Under the Sherbert v. Verner balancing test, a
compelling governmental interest must exist in order to justify governmental
actions that substantially burdens a religious practice. Id.
26 Id. at 885.
27 Id. at 880. The Court reasoned that "to make an individual's obligation to
obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious
beliefs, except where the State's interest is 'compelling' . . . contradicts both
constitutional tradition and common sense." Id.
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to be religious, then the court must determine whether those
beliefs are genuinely and sincerely held.29
In Berg v. Glen Cove City School District,30 the plaintiffs
commenced an action against the school district alleging that the
defendant violated their constitutionally protected right of
freedom of religion by prohibiting the infanit plaintiffs from
attending school in the Glen Cove City School District, unless
plaintiffs had their children immunized. 3' Plaintiffs contended
that the immunizations required by § 2164 of the Public Health
Law were contrary to their genuine and sincere: religious beliefs
and that they were entitled to the benefit of the exemption set
forth in § 2164 (9).2 The United States District Court stated that
"because the statutory exception is for persons whose opposition
to immunizations stems from religious beliefs, it does not extend
to persons whose views are founded upon medical or purely
moral considerations, scientific and secular theories, or
philosophical or personal beliefs." 33  Thus, the court reasoned
that it must first be determined whether the plaintiff's purported
beliefs are "religious." 34 If the beliefs are considered religious,
"then the court must determine whether those beliefs are
genuinely and sincerely held." 35 In other words, where a state
statute impacts on a plaintiff's First Amendment rights, a plaintiff
must show that his opposition to the statute is based on beliefs
that qualify as religious, and the plaintiff must shtow that he holds
those beliefs both genuinely and sincerely in order to meet the




30 Id. at 65 1.
31 Id. at 652.
32 id. • o
33 Berg, 853 F. Supp. aC655 (citing Mason v. Gen. Brown Cent. Sch. Dist.,
851 F.2d 47, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1981) which found that the beliefs of the plaintiffs
were based on scientific and secular theories, not religious beliefs and
therefore were not protected under the exception).
34 Id. at 655.
33 Id.
36 Id. Plaintiffs maintained that the basis for their opposition to
immunization was their own interpretation of passages from certain Hebrew
2002 265
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In order to determine whether a belief is religious, there
must be a threshold inquiry into the religious aspect of particular
beliefs and practices. 37 It is not enough for an individual to assert
that a belief he holds is religious. 38  "If plaintiffs assert their
claim 'because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of
contemporary secular values accepted by the majority,' their
claims do 'not rest on a religious basis.' "9 In Mason v. General
Brown Central School District,40 the court stated, "Everyone
makes basic choices about where to live, what to eat, and how to
raise children. Merely because these decisions are important, and
may be supported by strong conviction, does not render them
religious. " 41 Beliefs of this nature are more likely to be based on
philosophical reasoning and are therefore not protected by the
Free Exercise Clause.
42
Once the court makes a finding that an individual's beliefs
are religious, the court must determine whether those beliefs are
genuinely and sincerely held.43 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit set forth the necessary standard to
prove that a religious belief is sincere in International Society for
Krishna Consciousness v. Barber." In Krishna, the court held
that it must determine the subjective good faith of a person in
performing certain rituals.45 The purpose of this analysis was to
scripture. "Based on plaintiffs' statement of their beliefs in the complaint, it
appears that plaintiffs will likely succeed on their claim that the beliefs they
hold opposing immunization qualify as 'religious.' " Id.
37 Mason, 851 F.2d at 51.
38 Id.
39 Id. (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972)).
40 Id. at 47. "Plaintiffs believe that the human body possesses the means of
healing itself without medical intervention and there.frre, immunizations are
unnecessary and indeed contrary to the 'genetic blueprint' intended by nature."
Id. at 48. The court held that plaintiffs could not utilize § 2164 to claim an
exemption from immunizations because "their beliefs were based on
chiropractic principles and scientific beliefs as opposed to religious beliefs."
Id.
41 Id. at 52.
42 Id.
41 Berg, 853 F. Supp. at 655.
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protect those beliefs that a person holds as a matter of
conscience.46 In many situations, it is difficult for the court to
conclude that a particular belief can be sincerely held. 47  The
Krishna court further reasoned that "[h]uman nature being what it
is, however, it is frequently difficult to separate this inquiry from
a forbidden one involving the verity of the underlying belief."
48
Therefore, in order to make this determination, the court can
evaluate extrinsic evidence. 49 For example, in Berg, the court's
examination of certain medical and dental records substantiated
plaintiffs' claim.50 The court found that the plaintiffs held their
beliefs genuinely and sincerely.5'
In dealing with state requirements that impact upon the
Free Exercise Clause, the New York State courts generally
adhere to a balancing test that includes a "compelling government
interest" component. In Matter of Miller,52 the Allegany County
Sheriff denied an application for a pistol permit because petitioner
did not submit a photograph.5 3 Petitioner filed suit seeking an
order directing the Sheriff to exempt him from the photograph
requirement on the grounds that it violated his religious beliefs. 4
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department dismissed the
petitioner's claim." The court applied a traditional balancing test
which involved a two step aiialysis: "(1) whether the party
claiming the free exercise right has established a sincerely held
religious belief that is burdened by the statutory requirement; and
(2) whether the state has demonstrated that 'the requirement
46 id.
47 Id.
48 Id. (citing United States v. Ballard, 222 U.S. 78, 92-95 (1944) (Jackson,
J., dissenting).
41 Barber, 650 F.2d at 441. For example, an adherent's belief would not be
"sincere" if he acts in a manner inconsistent with that belief, or if there is
evidence that the adherent materially gains by fraudulently hiding secular
interests behind a veil of religious doctrine. Id.
5o Berg, 853 F. Supp. at 655.
5' Id.
52 252 A.D.2d 156, 684 N.Y.S.2d 368 (4th Dep't 1998).53 Id. at 157, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
54 Id.
" Id. at 160, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
2002 267
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nonetheless serves a compelling governmental purpose, and that
an exemption would substantially impede fulfillment of that goal.'
,,56 In analyzing petitioner's claim, the court found that there
were other available means for the petitioner to hunt deer, which
would not require him to submit to the photograph requirement
and would reduce the burden on his religious beliefs.57 Also, the
court found that the compelling governmental interest in
enforcing criminal laws involving firearms justified the burden
placed upon the petitioner's exercise of religious beliefs.
58
The New York courts have taken a similar approach in
handling public health law statutes that affect the Free Exercise
Clause. In Brown v. City School District of the City of
Coming, 59 the plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from
preventing Ysreen from attending classes at school.60 Ysreen
had not received the immunizations required by § 2164 of the
Public Health Law. 61 However, the plaintiff claimed that the
exemption contained in subdivision 9 of § 2164 exempted him
from the required inoculations. 62 The court stated that a parent
who comes before a New York court claiming exemption from a
statute that impacts upon the Free Exercise Clause must satisfy a
two-part test: "First, the court must be satisfied as to the
sincerity of the religious belief; and, secondly, that there is no
present circumstance which, in the opinion of the public health
authorities, represents a clear and present danger of the particular
communicable disease. ,63 In analyzing Brown's claim, the court
found that no "grave and immediate danger" was shown. 64 New
York State Department of Health's Immunization Program
coordinator, who was employed by the federal government,
testified that he was unaware of any cases of illnesses in the
56 Id. at 159-60, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 371 (citations omitted).
" Miller, 252 A.D.2d at 160, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
58 Id.
'9 104 Misc. 2d 796, 429 N.Y.S.2d 355 (1980).60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 797, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 355-56.
63 Id. at 800, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
64 Brown, 104 Misc. 2d. at 799, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
268 [Vol 18
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Corning City School District, which was the reason for wanting
children who attend the schools to receive the inoculations .65 The
Superintendent of Schools testified that there were only four
children within the school district who had not received
immunizations, presenting no clear and present danger.66
Therefore, in applying this balancing test, the court held that the
plaintiff was entitled to the exemption provided by Public Health
Law § 2164 (9).67
In sum, federal and New York State law are similar with
respect to statutes that affect the Free Exercise Clause. In
analyzing whether a statutory requirement violates an individual's
constitutional right to free exercise of religion under the United
States Constitution, federal courts typically apply a two-part test.
First, the court must determine whether plaintiffs' purported
beliefs are "religious." 68  Second, if the plaintiff's purported
beliefs are religious, then the court must determine whether those
beliefs are genuinely and sincerely held.69
New York State courts use a similar test in order to
determine whether a statute violates the Free Exercise Clause.
The New York courts generally adhere to a two-part test: First,
the religious belief must be sincerely held.7 ° If the religious
beliefs are sincerely held, then the State must demonstrate that
"the requirement nonetheless serves a compelling governmental
purpose, and that an exemption would substantially impede
fulfillment of that goal." 71 This "compelling government
interest" component requires a case-by-case determination about
whether such a burden on specific individuals is constitutionally
significant and whether the particular interest asserted by the New
York State government is compelling. It appears that the New
York balancing test provides greater protection to an individual's
65 Id. at 799, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
66 id.
67 Id. at 800, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
68 Berg, 853 F. Supp. at 655.
69 Id.
70 Brown, 104 Misc. 2d at 800, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
7' Miller, 252 A.D.2d at 159-60, 684 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
2002 269
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free exercise of religion than the facially neutral and generally
applicable standard followed by the federal courts.
Jonathan Janofsky
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